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It’s About Time: The Long 
Overdue Demise of Statutes of 
Repose in Latent Toxic Tort 
Litigation 
Jean Macchiaroli Eggen† 
Abstract 
Latent toxic illness typically does not become manifest until 
months, years, or decades after a person’s exposure to a toxic 
substance. The timing, extent, and characteristics of its physical man-
ifestation are unpredictable and vary among individuals. Similarly, 
property damages associated with environmental contamination may 
not be detected for years, and the diseases caused by the contam-
ination could take even longer to manifest. Accordingly, toxic harms 
present unique challenges for plaintiffs confronted with time limita-
tions on their actions. Statutes of repose operate in conjunction with 
statutes of limitations to provide defendants with maximum 
protection from stale claims. Unlike statutes of limitations, however, 
they run from an event external to the plaintiff’s injury, such as the 
sale of a product or the completion of an improvement to real prop-
erty. Even if the statute of limitations has not yet expired, the 
plaintiff’s claim may nevertheless be barred if it is brought after the 
repose period. Plaintiffs whose latent illnesses take longer to become 
detectable are likely to be time-barred; conversely, those who get sick 
sooner, i.e. before the repose period expires, may bring their claims. 
This Article examines the ways in which statutes of repose—and their 
narrow judicial interpretations—negatively impact latent-illness 
claimants. The Article demonstrates that to date any attempts by 
state legislatures to remedy this situation have fallen short. This 
Article concludes that the best solution is the simplest one—an 
absolute statutory exclusion for claims based on latent injuries. 
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Introduction 
Plaintiffs with latent toxic injury claims often encounter sub-
stantive and procedural doctrines that bar recovery even when the 
merits of their claims seem to demand a remedy. Latent toxic illness 
is insidious, and the timing, extent, and characteristics of its physical 
manifestation are unpredictable. Thus, toxic injuries provide the 
states with unique challenges in formulating time limitations for 
bringing tort actions—through statutes of limitations and statutes of 
repose—while at the same time accomplishing the policy goals under-
lying the time limits. Toxic injury typically does not become manifest 
until a date significantly later than the time of the plaintiff’s exposure 
to the toxic substance. For example, asbestos-related illness may not 
manifest until years or decades after the plaintiff’s last exposure.1 
Similarly, property damages associated with environmental contami-
nation may not be detected for years, and the diseases caused by the 
contamination could take even longer to manifest.2 
 
1. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (discussing studies conducted during the 1950s and 1960s 
examining the occurrence of asbestosis in asbestos insulation workers); see 
also Dan Fagin, Toms River: A Story of Science and Salvation 
260–67 (2013) (discussing the triggers of carcinogenesis). 
2. One of the earliest and most dramatic examples was the so-called “Love 
Canal” environmental disaster site, which generated evacuations, remediation, 
and decades of litigation. See generally, Lessons from Love Canal: A Public 
Health Resource, B.U. (2003), http://www.bu.edu/lovecanal/main2.html 
[https://perma.cc/5MGV-J6V8] (providing a history of the contamination, 
community action, and remediation at the site, extending over many years). 
This Article employs the terms “latent illness” and “latent toxic injury” 
throughout, but in certain contexts the terms are intended to encompass 
property contamination by toxic substances that could cause illness. 
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Statutes of limitations are ubiquitous, and their impact is well 
understood. Although nearly all the states and the District of 
Columbia have some form of tort statute of repose, these statutes, 
which may impose an absolute bar on some actions, are less con-
spicuous. Their impact on certain claims is either poorly understood 
or simply ignored by state legislatures. Statutes of repose operate in 
conjunction with, but in a manner different from, statutes of limi-
tations. While personal injury statutes of limitations begin to run at 
the time the action accrues—typically when the injury to the plaintiff 
occurs—statutes of repose run from a designated point in time 
external to the plaintiff, such as the manufacture and sale of a 
product.3 The state legislature defines in the first instance the act that 
triggers the running of the repose period. This act may have occurred 
years, or even decades, before the action accrues. The most common 
statutes of repose run for a fixed period of time from the sale of a 
product4 or from the completion of an improvement to real property.5 
Both types apply directly to latent toxic injury claims, the former to 
toxic product claims and the latter to environmental contamination 
claims and their associated personal injuries. When a statute of repose 
applies to the case in addition to a statute of limitations, the 
plaintiff’s action must be timely under both statutes. Thus, a plaintiff 
may be time-barred by the statute of repose even if the claim has not 
yet accrued under the statute of limitations.6 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the states began to recognize the un-
fairness of applying a strict statute of limitations, which typically ran 
from the last exposure to the toxic substance, in latent illness cases, 
leading to revision of their arbitrary rules to accommodate plaintiffs 
 
3. The United States Supreme Court has defined a statute of repose as placing 
“an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action [that] is measured not from 
the date on which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last 
culpable act or omission of the defendant.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. 
Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014). The Court called it “an ‘absolute . . . bar’ on a 
defendant’s temporal liability.” Id. at 2183 (citation omitted); cf. California 
Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Anz Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2050 (2017) 
(reasserting the concept of absolute bar in deciding that the petitioner, which 
had opted out of a class action settlement, was barred by a federal statute of 
repose from maintaining a subsequent individual action). 
4. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b)(2) (2017) (running for ten years from the 
date of “delivery” of the product). 
5. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-108(a) (West 2011) 
(running for twenty years from when the improvement is first available for its 
intended use). 
6. Conversely, unless the legislature provides otherwise by extending the accrual 
date, the claim could be barred by the statute of limitations before the period 
in the statute of repose expires. “Discovery” statutes of limitations are 
pervasive now, however, thus minimizing the likelihood of this scenario. 
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whose injuries manifested much later. The impetus for many of these 
statutory changes was the mass litigation arising from exposures to 
diethylstilbestrol (“DES”), the prescription drug given to pregnant 
women from the 1940s to the 1970s to prevent miscarriages.7 Latent 
injuries to the offspring of women who ingested DES during preg-
nancy included signature cancers and other reproductive injuries that 
typically manifested years after birth and into adulthood, well after 
both the initial exposure to DES in utero and the birth of the 
offspring.8 When these illnesses manifested they were long past the 
time allowed by the relevant statute of limitations for commencing a 
personal injury action. For reasons of fairness, the states eventually 
embraced “discovery” limitations periods9 for DES claims and other 
claims based upon latent toxic injuries, pursuant to which the action 
is deemed to have accrued when the plaintiff discovered or reason-
ably should have discovered the injury.10 
Although the states have uniformly embraced discovery statutes 
of limitations for latent disease claims, many states have remained in-
transigent in enforcing their repose statutes. Courts have routinely 
applied statutes of repose strictly and arbitrarily, with harsh results 
for plaintiffs. For example, in In re Depakote: Alexander v. Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc.,11 the court conducted a choice of law analysis and 
 
7. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1989) 
(discussing the statute of limitations problems associated with DES-related 
illness). 
8. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. 1982) (discussing 
the connection between pre-natal DES exposure and cancer). 
9. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 2003) (running the three-year 
statute of limitations “from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff 
or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury 
should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier,” in cases 
involving latent injury); Moll v. Abbott Labs., 506 N.W.2d 816, 823–24 
(Mich. 1993) (interpreting the Michigan discovery statute of limitations to 
apply to pharmaceutical product liability claims). 
10. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.8(a) (West 2006). In California, for 
actions based upon exposures to “a hazardous material or toxic substance,” 
the statute of limitations: 
shall be no later than either two years from the date of injury, or two 
years after the plaintiff becomes aware of, or reasonably should have 
become aware of, (1) an injury, (2) the physical cause of the injury, 
and (3) sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice 
that the injury was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act of 
another, whichever occurs later. 
Id. 
11. No. 12–CV–52–NJR–SCW, 2017 WL 1326964 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2017), on 
recons., No. 12–CV–52–NJR–SCW, 2017 WL 3116238 (S.D. Ill. July 21, 
2017). 
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concluded that the Indiana product liability statute of repose barred 
the minor plaintiffs’ claims for birth defects arising from in utero 
exposures to the defendant’s prescription drug, Depakote, ingested by 
their mothers during pregnancy.12 Although Illinois—the other state 
with interests in the litigation—also had a statute of repose, it 
contained a tolling provision for minors, which would have benefited 
the plaintiffs.13 The court was not persuaded, however, by the 
plaintiffs’ argument that Illinois law should apply because of its policy 
interest in protecting minors from harsh results and ruled instead that 
the Indiana bar should apply.14 
Even in cases in which the relevant discovery statute of 
limitations is sufficiently broad to accommodate the plaintiff’s 
claims—and where the equities of the case demand a remedy—the 
statute of repose has often barred the claim. Consider, hypothetically, 
a state that has a discovery statute of limitations for personal injuries 
that runs for three years from the time that the plaintiff knows of the 
injury and also knows of its likely cause. The same jurisdiction has a 
statute of repose for product liability claims that runs for ten years 
from the date on which the defendant sold the product to the initial 
consumer. Assume the plaintiff brings a product liability personal 
injury claim against the defendant product seller less than three years 
after her undisputed diagnosis and knowledge of causal connection to 
the defendant’s product. But the claim happens to be commenced 
twenty years from the time the product was first sold because the 
plaintiff’s illness took many years to manifest. Clearly the plaintiff 
would not be barred by the statute of limitations, but, absent an 
exception, the claim is absolutely barred by the ten-year statute of 
repose. 
The states are not unaware of this problem, and some have 
struggled with the inherent unfairness of applying statutes of repose 
to latent injury claims. Although the states have uniformly embraced 
the concept of discovery statutes of limitations to address this 
problem, those states with statutes of repose have largely done little 
to fully alleviate the disability that repose places on latent injury 
plaintiffs who are unfortunate enough to have their injuries manifest 
after the expiration of the repose period. Several state courts have 
flatly rejected the harsh and arbitrary bar of statutes of repose on 
 
12. Id. at *4. 
13. Id. at *5; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-213(d) (West 2011) 
invalidated by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1105–06 (Ill. 
1997) (tolling the period of limitations until the person turns eighteen or is no 
longer under a legal disability). 
14. In re Depakote, 2017 WL 1326964, at *6–7. 
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state constitutional grounds.15 On the other end of the spectrum are 
the states that continue to tolerate the inequities of their repose 
statutes in the service of absolute protection of certain business in-
terests and activities. In between these extremes are the states that 
have undertaken ad hoc efforts, resulting in a hodge-podge of in-
sufficient state rules enacted incrementally and favoring certain toxic 
tort plaintiffs over others. Where a statute of repose applies to some 
or all latent toxic injury cases, the difference between a viable claim 
and one that is time-barred may simply be the fortuity of one 
plaintiff’s illness manifesting a day before the illness of another 
plaintiff. 
With these considerations in mind, this Article argues that latent 
toxic injury cases have unique characteristics that make it funda-
mentally unfair to apply statutes of repose in most cases. These 
considerations substantially outweigh any need for shielding defen-
dants from stale claims and unexpected liabilities. Accordingly, states 
determined to retain their statutes of repose for at least some claims 
should enact an absolute exclusion for latent illness claims. Part I of 
this Article provides a brief overview of the types of statutes of repose 
that appear in latent toxic injury litigation, demonstrating the harsh 
results of a strict interpretation of the statutes and examining the 
typical justifications for these callous rules. Part II surveys some of 
the ways that states have chipped away at their repose statutes for 
latent illness claims, including judicial rulings on their constitu-
tionality, and demonstrates the inadequacy of those attempts. Part III 
seeks an effective solution to the problem and shows that even those 
few states that have enacted broad exceptions for latent injuries sim-
ply do not go far enough. Ultimately, this Article concludes that only 
an absolute exclusion for latent injury claims will suffice to avoid the 
disability that statutes of repose impose upon toxic tort plaintiffs. 
I. An Overview of the Problem 
Statutes of repose operate in conjunction with statutes of limita-
tions to provide maximum protection for defendants. Traditionally, 
personal injury actions were deemed to accrue for statute of 
limitations purposes at the time the tort occurs, which was when the 
plaintiff suffered injury.16 Two events—the defendant’s act and the 
plaintiff’s injury—typically occurred at or around the same time, as 
with most motor vehicle accidents, for example. The full extent of the 
plaintiff’s injury might not be known at the time of the defendant’s 
 
15. See infra notes 62–77 and accompanying text. 
16. See Dan B. Dobbs et al., Hornbook on Torts § 18.2, at 429 (2d ed. 
2016). 
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act, but the fact that the plaintiff suffered an injury was known. 
Statutes of limitations did not originally contemplate latent illness 
cases, in which the time between the defendant’s action, the plaintiff’s 
exposure to a toxic substance, and the first manifestation of an illness 
caused by that exposure could stretch for years or decades. Courts 
and legislatures eventually relented on the arbitrary bar of statutes of 
limitations by introducing the “discovery” concept for latent illness. 
The New Hampshire statute of limitations for “personal actions,” ex-
cludeing defamation, contains typical language: 
[The action] may be brought only within 3 years of the act or 
omission complained of, except that when the injury and its 
causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered 
and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of 
the act or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3 
years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its 
causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.17 
A few jurisdictions have crafted specific discovery statutes for latent 
harms associated with specific toxic exposures, such as hazardous 
chemicals.18 All discovery statutes of limitations recognize the funda-
mental unfairness of barring a plaintiff’s claim before the plaintiff 
knew or could have known of the illness. 
In contrast, statutes of repose run from the time of a particular 
act by the defendant, such as the sale of a product,19 the designation 
 
17. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I) (2010). 
18. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577c (West 2013), amended by 2015 
Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 15-67 (West). The Connecticut statute of limitations 
provides a discovery rule for claims due to “exposure to a hazardous chemical 
substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant.” Id. (running two years from the 
date when the injury was discovered or reasonably could have been discovered). 
The New York discovery statute of limitations for “latent effects of exposure to 
any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the 
body or upon or within property” is broader, including products and biological 
substances. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c(2) (McKinney 2003). Although the New York 
statute allows the plaintiff time to ascertain the cause of the illness and thereby 
identify the defendant, the plaintiff’s task becomes more onerous as time goes on, 
and eventually a final repose is imposed. Id. 214-c(4). 
19. See Ala. Code § 6-5-502(c) (2014), invalidated by Lankford v. Sullivan, 
Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 12-551 (2016), invalidated by Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 
625, 630 (Ariz. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(a) (West 2013); 
Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (2017); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (2007); 
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-213(b) (West 2011), invalidated by Best v. 
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1105–06 (Ill. 1997); Ind. Code § 34-
20-3-1 (2017); Iowa Code § 614.1(2A) (2017); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 411.310(1) (West 2017); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224(2) (2016); N.H. Rev. 
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of the product’s useful safe life,20 the completion of an improvement to 
real property,21 or the time of a particular medical treatment,22 
 
Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2(II)(a) (2010), invalidated by Heath v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-46.1 (2015); N.D. 
Cent. Code § 28-01.3-08(1) (2016), invalidated by Dickie v. Farmers Union 
Oil Co. of LaMoure, 611 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2305.10(C) (West 2004); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905 (2015); 9 R.I. Gen. 
Laws Ann. § 9-1-13(b) (West 2006), invalidated by Kennedy v. Cumberland 
Eng’g Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a) 
(2012); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.012(b) (West 2002); 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(5) (2015–16). 
20. See e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(c) (West 2013), amended by 
2017 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 17-97 (H.B. 7194) (West) (allowing an exception 
to the statute of repose for plaintiffs who can prove that the harm occurred 
during the useful safe life of the product); Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (2017); 
Idaho Code § 6-1403(1) (2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(b)(1) (2005); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(13) (West 2013) (stating if the 
product has been in use for ten years or more, the plaintiff loses any 
presumptions that otherwise would apply); Minn. Stat. § 604.03 (2017); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a) (2012); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 7.72.060(1)(a), (2) (2017). 
21. See e.g., Ala. Code § 6-5-218(a) (2014), invalidated by Jackson v. 
Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Alaska Stat. 
Ann. § 09.10.055(a) (2007); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-552(A) (2016); 
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-112 (West 2013); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§§ 337.1, 337.15 (West 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-104 (2017); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584a (West 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8127 
(2016); D.C. Code § 12-310 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(c) (2017); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 9-3-51 (2017); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 657-8 (West 2008); 
Idaho Code § 5-241 (2010); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-214 (West 
2011), amended by 2014 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-1131 (S.B. 2221) (West); 
Ind. Code § 32-30-1-5(d) (2017); Iowa Code § 614.1(11)(a) (2017); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.135 (West 2017), invalidated by Perkins v. Ne. Log 
Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2772(A)(1) (2005); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 752-A (2003); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. § 5-108(a) (West 2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B 
(2016); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5839 (West 2013); Minn. Stat. 
§ 541.051 (2017); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-41 (West 2013); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 516.097 (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-208 (2017); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 11.202, 11.2055 (2016); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-b (2010); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1.1 (West 2015); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-27 
(West 2010); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(f) (2015); N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 28-01-44 (2016); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.131 (West 2004); Okla. 
Stat. tit. 12, § 109 (2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.135(1) (2015); 42 Pa. 
Stat. and Cons. Ann. § 5536 (West 2004); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-
1-29 (West 2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (2017); S.D. Codified 
Laws §§ 15-2A-3 to -9 (2014); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-202 to -205 (West 
2012); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.008 to .009(a) (West 
2002); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(4) (LexisNexis 2012); Va. Code 
Ann. § 8.01-250 (West 2017); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.310 (2017); W. 
Va. Code Ann. § 55-2-6a (West 2002), amended by 2015 W. Va. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 2; Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2015–16); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-3-111 
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regardless of when the plaintiff suffered injury. The Georgia product 
liability statute, for example, provides that “[n]o action shall be 
commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after 
ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the 
personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.”23 
Pennsylvania’s real property improvements statute of repose provides 
that actions for property damage or personal injury against develop-
ers, contractors, or architects of a real property improvement may not 
be brought more than twelve years after “construction of such 
improvement.”24 Thus, a repose provision sets an arbitrary outside 
limit on all claims, even if the person has not yet discovered the basis 
for the claim.25 
Statutes of repose such as these were the darlings of the tort 
reform movement in the late twentieth century, touted by reformists 
bent on protecting business and industry from tort lawsuits.26 With 
plaintiff-friendly developments such as the abrogation of the privity 
requirement and the expansion of strict product liability, legislatures 
and courts solidified these arbitrary time limits to even the playing 
field.27 Architects, engineers, and building contractors felt the same 
pressure as product sellers from the abandonment of privity28 in ac-
 
to -113 (West 2007); see also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-223 (2016) (running 
from “the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action”); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 1-52(16) (2015) (stating the general tort claim statute of repose), 
amended by H.B. No. 436, 2017 Gen. Assembly (N.C.). 
22. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-18(3) (2016); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-3-404(1) (LexisNexis 2012); W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7B-4 (West 
2002), amended by 2017 W. Va. Legis. Serv. Ch. 3. The North Dakota statute 
expressly states that the repose period will not be extended for non-discovery 
of the injury, unless the non-discovery was caused by the defendant’s fraud. 
N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-18(3) (2016). Some medical malpractice statutes 
of repose contain an exception for discovery of a foreign object left inside the 
plaintiff. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 4 (2016). Medical 
malpractice repose statutes are outside the scope of this Article, however, as 
the injuries typically are not latent illnesses caused by exposure to a toxic 
substance. 
23. Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (2007). 
24. 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Ann. § 5536(a) (West 2004). 
25. See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2187 (2014). 
26. Dobbs Et Al., supra note 16, § 18.4, at 433. 
27. See id.; cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1994). The 
Georgia Supreme Court noted that the stabilization of the product liability 
insurance underwriting market was a goal of the statute of repose, which 
applied to both strict liability and negligence actions. Id. 
28. See, e.g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding that 
privity of contract no longer applied to negligence claims against a building 
contractor). 
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tions against them for improvements to real property.29 Furthermore, 
those engaged in building design and construction resented what they 
viewed as the unfairness of the discovery statutes of limitations and 
lobbied for the kind of finite limit on litigation that a statute of re-
pose would impose.30 
Some state legislatures have included in their statutes of repose 
the policies they hoped repose would advance. To this end, for ex-
ample, the Utah legislature provided a list of general “findings” in the 
state’s statute of repose for claims related to improvements to real 
property.31 This list reflects the universal policy justifications for 
statutes of repose in all contexts. The Utah legislature first expressed 
the view that after a certain length of time, “the possibility of injury 
or damage . . . become[s] highly remote,” which results in “unexpect-
ed[] . . . costs and hardships” for the defendant.32 Ultimately, the 
legislature stated, the possibility of injury becomes too “remote and 
unexpected” more than seven years from the completion of the 
improvement,33 presumably diminishing any perceived unfairness to 
plaintiffs. The statute identifies certain “undue and unlimited liability 
risks” that include, but are not limited to, the cost of liability 
insurance, the cost of document storage, and the hardship of defend-
ing against claims brought many years after a project is finished.34 
Not to put too fine a point on it, the legislature stated that “these 
costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils.”35 
Essentially, these justifications amount to unpredictability and inabil-
ity to accurately estimate and plan for future costs. 
The Alabama legislature articulated a common variation on these 
policies, this time referencing product liability litigation: 
The Legislature finds that product liability actions and 
litigation have increased substantially, and the cost of such 
litigation has risen in recent years. The Legislature further finds 
that these increases are having an impact upon consumer prices, 
and upon the availability, cost, and use of product liability 
 
29. Michael J. Vardaro & Jennifer E. Waggoner, Note, Statutes of Repose—The 
Design Professional’s Defense to Perpetual Liability, 10 St. John’s J. 
Legal Comment. 697, 715–16 (1995). 
30. Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725, 728–29 (Ala. 1983) 
(holding the Alabama statute of repose for improvements to real property 
unconstitutional). 
31. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2) (LexisNexis 2012). 
32. Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(a). 
33. Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(d). 
34. Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(b). 
35. Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(c). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Long Overdue Demise of Statutes of Repose 
33 
insurance, thus, affecting the availability of compensation for 
injured consumers.36 
Thus, Alabama went further than Utah on the tort reform band-
wagon, suggesting that even spreading losses through consumer prices 
and liability insurance would nevertheless result in such high costs to 
defendants that little would be left to compensate injured consumers. 
To ameliorate these perceived “social evils,”37 the legislature adopted 
a consistent set of limitations and repose rules for all product liability 
actions.38 
With respect to improvements to real property, the South Dakota 
legislature articulated a set of policy justifications for mandating a 
repose period which were specifically directed at real property con-
struction projects. The legislature stated that following completion of 
a project: 
[P]ersons involved in the planning, design, and construction of 
improvements to real estate lack control over the determination 
of the need for, the undertaking of and the responsibility for 
maintenance, and lack control over other forces, uses and 
intervening causes which cause stress, strain, wear, and tear to 
the improvements and, in most cases, have no right or 
opportunity to be made aware of or to evaluate the effect of 
these forces on a particular improvement or to take action to 
overcome the effect of these forces.39 
Accordingly, the statute established an outside limit for actions of ten 
years following the substantial completion of a project.40 In the opin-
ion of the legislature, the repose period was “in the public interest and 
in the interest of equating the rights of due process between the 
prospective litigants.”41  
These policies are less explicit in other real property improvement 
statutes of repose. A common exception to real property improvement 
statutes are claims against the party in possession of the improvement 
 
36. Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (2014). 
37. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1001 (Ala. 1982). 
38. Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (“It is the intent of the Legislature that a 
comprehensive system consisting of the time for commencement of actions, for 
discoverability of actions based upon insidious disease and the repose of 
actions shall be instituted in this state.”). 
39. S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2A-1 (2014). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
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after completion, typically a landowner or tenant.42 This exception 
allows claims against parties with continuing control of the improve-
ment and with the ability to maintain and repair it. While the control 
justification may be theoretically valid, it completely ignores the prac-
tical situation in which a person is exposed to a toxic condition prior 
to the expiration of the repose period, but manifests an illness after 
the repose period has expired. 
Another argument in favor of statutes of repose for claims arising 
from improvements to real property is that architectural and 
engineering creativity is unfairly restricted by the prospect of 
unending litigation.43 Of course, the same could be said for the design-
ers of products, including medical devices, prescription drugs, and 
thousands of other products that could result in serious—and 
potentially latent—injuries to consumers. This Article posits that the 
policy justifications for both product liability and real property im-
provement statutes of repose are manifestly unfair when the injury 
claimed is latent illness.44 
The states’ reluctance to reform their statutes of repose is ex-
plained by the policies the legislatures have advanced, policies that go 
beyond merely assuring an end to anticipated litigation. As the Utah 
statute demonstrated, statutes of repose are intended to protect 
broader business interests.45 Forcing a business entity to defend a tort 
claim beyond a certain fixed time constitutes a “clear social and 
economic evil[]” in the legislature’s express view.46 Such hyperbolic 
language evinces a strong preference for the interests of business over 
the rights of injured parties to compensation. The states may also 
have felt the need to even the playing field because of a perceived 
advantage that some modern tort doctrines, such as strict product 
liability, may have provided to plaintiffs.47 Because statutes of repose 
may bar a claim that would otherwise be timely under the statute of 
 
42. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337.1(d) (West 2006) (patent defects); 
id. § 337.15(e) (latent defects); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-104(3) (2017); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(d) (2015). 
43. Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 29, at 715–16. 
44. See infra notes 114–120, 169–179 and accompanying text. 
45. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 
46. Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(c). 
47. See Dobbs et al., supra note 16, § 18.4, at 433 (noting that statutes of 
repose evolved to provide a procedural replacement for some obsolete 
substantive tort doctrines that had shielded some defendants from liability, 
such as the privity rule in product liability cases). 
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limitations, statutes of repose are the ultimate trump card for defend-
ants.48 
A close examination of the interaction of a statute of repose and a 
statute of limitations in a toxic latent illness case is particularly 
instructive. This interaction and its arbitrary result is exemplified by 
Montgomery v. Wyeth,49 a case under Tennessee law. Tennessee courts 
had long interpreted the personal injury statute of limitations to be a 
discovery statute.50 But the state’s product liability statute of repose 
added an additional restriction, providing that: 
[An action] must be brought within six (6) years of the date of 
injury, in any event, the action must be brought within ten (10) 
years from the date on which the product was first purchased 
for use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the 
expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the 
shorter.51 
In Montgomery, the plaintiff took the defendant’s drug in 1997, 
during the short period of time that it was on the market.52 She was 
diagnosed with pulmonary hypertension in 2005 and brought a 
personal injury action within six months of the diagnosis, well within 
the discovery statute of limitations.53 But her personal injury claim 
was barred by the accompanying statute of repose.54 Although the 
plaintiff brought suit within ten years of her first use or consumption 
of the drug, the court held that the “anticipated life” of the product 
had expired.55 The Tennessee legislature defined “anticipated life” as 
determined by “the ‘expiration date placed on the product by the 
manufacturer when required by law.’”56 The Sixth Circuit, affirming 
the district court, held that because the expiration date set by Wyeth 
 
48. The bar can work the other way as well, i.e., a claim timely under the statute 
of repose could still be barred if it is beyond the statute of limitations. This 
scenario is far less likely to occur in cases involving latent toxic injury subject 
to a discovery statute of limitations. 
49. 580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009). 
50. See McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 
1975). 
51. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a) (West 2012). The statute contains an 
exception for asbestos and silicone gel breast implants. Id. § 29-28-103(b). 
52. Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 458. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 458–59. 
55. Id. at 467 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(1) (West 2012)). 
56. Id. (quoting § 29-28-102(1)). 
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for its drug was three years from the date of manufacture, here 1997, 
the statute of repose barred any action brought after September 2000, 
regardless of the fact that it was brought within ten years of first 
purchase.57 Moreover, the plaintiff did not need to know the expi-
ration date for the action to be barred.58 The court stated: “‘Statutes 
of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience 
rather than logic . . . . They represent a public policy about the 
privilege to litigate.’”59 
Montgomery illustrates the inherent unfairness of a statute of 
repose and its particular unfairness to latent illness plaintiffs. The 
plaintiff’s action was timely under the statute of limitations, but ran 
afoul of an especially arbitrary and restrictive clause in the statute of 
repose. The determination of the “anticipated life” of the product was 
exclusively within the manufacturer’s domain, and the setting of the 
expiration date did not require any logical or reasonable basis. The 
plaintiff had no control over when she would become ill, placing her 
at a decided disadvantage for any legal recovery. Moreover, the stat-
ute treated her differently from any plaintiffs who had the fortuity to 
develop the same illness earlier in time and within the statute’s 
parameters. The message the statute communicates to manufacturers 
is to set early expiration dates so as to reduce the number of claims 
for latent injuries and receive maximum protection from product 
litigation. 
II. The Erratic Road to Reform 
For decades courts and scholars have been aware of the problems 
associated with applying statutes of repose to latent illness,60 but 
reform has been sluggish and stunningly inconsistent. Statutes of 
repose are creatures of state law, making state courts the ultimate 
arbiters of the validity of those statutes. Accordingly, early challeng-
ers to statutes of repose brought actions in state court that raised a 
variety of constitutional arguments under both state and federal con-
stitutional provisions, and some were successful.61 Although it is 
beyond the scope of this Article to examine the substance of these 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (quoting Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 140 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
60. See, e.g., Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1027–28 (Md. 
1983). 
61. See generally Francis E. McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and 
Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 
Forum 416, 425–29 (1980). 
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constitutional challenges in any detail, this Part begins with a brief 
overview of some of these cases. The cases demonstrate the tenacity of 
the policies underlying statutes of repose and reinforce the inequity of 
their application. This Part then examines legislative enactments that 
have limited the operation of statutes of repose under some circum-
stances, but which have been patently inadequate to address the 
problem of latent toxic illness. 
A. Early Constitutional Challenges 
Objectors have advanced a variety of constitutional arguments, 
with mixed and limited results. In Alabama, both the product liability 
statute62 and the real property improvements statute63 ran afoul of the 
state constitutional provision guaranteeing open courts.64 In holding 
that the product liability statute of repose violated this provision, the 
Alabama Supreme Court observed that the legislature’s list of “social 
evils” that necessitated a repose period bore no substantial relation-
ship to the ten-year statute of repose.65 The court ultimately con-
cluded that “[t]o say that barring claims involving products that have 
been used for more than 10 years will eradicate and ease the cost 
increases in consumer prices and product liability insurance is un-
reasonable in our opinion.”66 The court applied the same rationale in 
holding the real property improvements statute of repose in violation 
of the open courts provision, having rejected an effort to distinguish 
real property construction from manufactured products.67 
In New Hampshire, the state’s highest court held that the product 
liability statute of repose denied plaintiffs equal protection of the 
laws, concluding that the repose statute had no reasonable relation-
ship to the state’s objective of reducing product liability insurance 
 
62. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982) 
(holding Ala. Code § 6-5-502(c) (1975) unconstitutional). 
63. Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725, 728–29 (Ala. 1983) 
(holding Ala. Code § 6-5-218(a) (1975) unconstitutional). 
64. Ala. Const. art. I, § 13. 
65. Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1001 (citing Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (1975) (amended 
1979)). 
66. Id. The court also stated that the product liability statute was a violation of 
due process because “it does not provide for an extension of the limitation 
period for someone injured shortly before the expiration period.” Id. at 1003. 
The court suggested that the addition of a savings clause to allow claims for 
injuries occurring immediately prior to the expiration of the repose period 
would rectify the statute. Id. As this Article demonstrates, a savings provision 
does not solve the fundamental problem of latent illness claims. 
67. Jackson, 435 So. 2d at 728 (citing Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1002–03). 
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costs.68 In Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court reasoned that 
“[t]he effect of this absolute limitation on suits against manufacturers 
is to nullify some causes of actions before they even arise,”69 meaning 
that the injuries suffered by some product plaintiffs will not manifest 
until after the expiration of the statute of repose. The court was 
especially concerned with the statute’s disparate and arbitrary impact 
on product plaintiffs when compared to non-product plaintiffs whose 
claims were not subject to the statute of repose.70 
Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the general 
product liability statute of repose violated the equal protection clause 
of the state constitution because “[t]here is simply no demonstration 
by the testimony or evidence submitted to the legislature which shows 
harm or prejudice to sellers and manufacturers resulting from damage 
awards against them for injuries incurred more than 10 years from 
initial purchase or 11 years from manufacture of defective products.”71 
In contrast, a few years earlier the same court had upheld the ten-
year statute of repose applicable to improvements to real property 
against an equal protection challenge.72 When the product liability 
defendants tried to argue that the reasoning of the earlier case should 
apply equally to the product statute of repose, the court disagreed, 
stating that “‘[a]rchitects, contractors, engineers, and inspec-
tors . . . in most cases do not have continuing control over or 
involvement with the maintenance of the improvement after its initial 
construction,’” but a “‘materialman provides manufactured goods and 
should be held accountable under the general tort rules governing 
liability for defects in those products.’”73 
A few litigants have been successful with other constitutional 
arguments. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the 
statute of repose for improvements to real property violated both the 
state constitution’s prohibition against special legislation and its open 
courts provision.74 In so ruling, the Kentucky court stated that while 
“a majority of the states have upheld the construction industry’s 
statute of repose against attack on constitutional grounds,” the 
 
68. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983). 
69. Id. at 295.  
70. Id. 
71. Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 611 N.W.2d 168, 172 (N.D. 2000). 
72. Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733, 738 (N.D. 1988) (citing 
N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-44(1)(c) (2016)). 
73. Dickie, 611 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738). 
74. Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 817 (Ky. 1991) (discussing Ky. 
Const. §§ 14, 54, 59 & 241). 
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Kentucky state constitution mandated its finding of a violation.75 The 
court then punctuated its decision with an editorial comment: “If that 
places us in a statistical minority, we can only commiserate with the 
citizens of other states who do not enjoy similar protection.”76 
Those courts finding constitutional violations have emphasized 
the lack of evidence that statutes of repose achieve their legislative 
policy goals. But for the most part, as the Kentucky Supreme Court 
noted, statutes of repose have withstood constitutional challenges.77 
Some state legislatures have recognized the problems that statutes of 
repose create for plaintiffs with latent illness claims and have taken 
action—usually on an ad hoc basis—to minimize or eliminate those 
problems, but these efforts have lacked a comprehensive and effective 
approach. 
B. Legislative Revisions 
Attempts to solve the problems of repose statutes for latent illness 
plaintiffs are evident in both product liability legislation and statutes 
addressing improvements to real property, but to date these attempts 
have fallen short. In some states, the problems are compounded by 
the multiple identities of some substances as both products and 
releases into the environment during and after property improve-
ments.78 For example, lead may be harmful as a product component,79 
 
75. Id. at 818. 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the Tennessee product liability statute of repose does not violate 
the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution or 
the state constitutional prohibition of impairment of contracts); Mercado v. 
Baker, 792 P.2d 342, 343–44 (Idaho 1990) (holding that the Idaho product 
liability statute of repose does not deny equal protection of the law or violate 
the open courts provision of the state constitution, nor is it unconstitutionally 
vague); Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 
1200–01 (Utah 1999) (holding that the Utah construction statute of repose 
did not violate the open courts provision of the state constitution because the 
legislature clearly identified the “social evils” the statute was intended to 
address). 
78. This multiple identity issue has led some states to explicitly exclude defective 
products from the scope of their real property improvement statutes of repose. 
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.10.055(b)(1)(E) (2007) (excluding defective 
products); D.C. Code § 12-310(b)(3) (2001) (excluding “any manufacturer 
or supplier of any equipment or machinery or other articles installed in a 
structure upon real property”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.202(2)(b)(2) (2016) 
(excluding defective products); see also Buttz v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 557 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 1996) (holding that asbestos used for a real 
property improvement was a product, and not subject to the statute of 
repose, because the plaintiff’s exposure occurred before the asbestos-containing 
product was attached to the real property). But see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-
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and also when released into the environment at certain levels, re-
sulting in non-product tort claims such as nuisance.80 Furthermore, 
strict construction of statutes of repose has achieved inconsistent and 
illogical results. Examples abound, and, at their most complex, a 
state’s statutory clusters create a legal Gordian knot. 
Some states have excluded from repose a single substance or 
several substances known to cause latent illness and to which a 
plaintiff must have been exposed to avoid repose.81 These statutes are 
often construed very narrowly and to the detriment of plaintiffs, as a 
Tennessee case illustrates.82 The same Tennessee statute of repose 
that thwarted the plaintiff in Montgomery83 contains an exception for 
asbestos exposure and silicone gel breast implants.84 This provision 
has been applied strictly—some might say mercilessly. In Adams v. 
Air Liquide America,85 the court affirmed the dismissal of a case 
brought by a sandblaster who suffered from silicosis and silica-related 
lung cancer.86 The Tennessee court determined that silica was 
 
640(9) (2017) (including within the repose period actions against “owners or 
manufacturers of components, or against any person furnishing materials” for 
the improvement). 
79. See, e.g., Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 134 So. 3d 706, 712 
(Miss. 2014) (denying summary judgment to the defendant in a product 
liability action because a material question of fact existed as to whether the 
plaintiff was exposed to the defendant’s lead paint product). 
80. See, e.g., Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d 589, 
605–06 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (denying the local and state officials’ motions to 
dismiss in an action arising from lead contamination of the public water 
supply in Flint, Michigan). 
81. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.10.055(b)(1)(A) (2007) (excluding injury from 
“prolonged exposure to hazardous waste” from the construction repose 
statute); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(e) (West 2013), amended by 
2017 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 17-97 (West) (excluding injury from asbestos); 
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-214(f) (West 2011), amended by 2014 Ill. 
Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-1131 (West) (excluding discharge of asbestos into the 
environment from the real property improvements repose statute); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (West 2012) (excluding asbestos and silicone gel 
breast implants from the product liability repose statute). Other states have 
special, longer statutes of repose for specific exposures. See, e.g., Idaho 
Code § 5-243 (2010) (providing a thirty-year repose period for ionizing 
radiation injuries). 
82. See Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). 
83. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
84. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (West 2012). 
85. No. M2013–02607–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 6680693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 
2014). 
86. Id. at *6.  
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sufficiently distinguishable from asbestos to receive different 
treatment under the statute of repose.87 The plaintiff challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute of repose on the grounds that it vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution88 
and the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution.89 
The court held that the state legislature had a rational basis for 
distinguishing asbestos and silicone breast implants from other 
substances covered by the statute of repose.90 Among other things, the 
court noted that while asbestos had been designated a toxic 
substance, silica had not, and that while silicosis is uniquely 
occupational in nature, asbestosis may affect nonworkers exposed in 
homes, schools, and other locations.91 Accordingly, the court rejected 
the constitutional claims.92 Had the court ruled the other way, 
however, its decision easily would have been supported by substantial 
medical and scientific evidence of similarities between asbestos disease 
and silica disease. Both are typically workplace dust exposures, and 
either may cause both non-malignant obstructive lung disease and 
forms of lung cancer.93 The court’s decision was purely policy-based 
 
87. Id.  
88. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
89. Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 8. 
90. Adams, 2014 WL 6680693, at *6; see also Wyatt v. A-Best Prods. Co., 924 
S.W.2d 98, 106−07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the asbestos 
exception withstood an equal protection challenge). In Wyatt, the court 
reasoned that even if extending the exception in the statute of repose to all 
latent injuries would have been a better means of addressing the issues raised, 
there is no requirement that the legislature select the best or most perfect 
option, only a rational option. The court concluded that “we cannot say that 
the General Assembly’s decision to classify asbestos-related claims differently 
from other latent-injury claims is so patently arbitrary as lacking any rational 
basis.” Id. at 106. 
91. Adams, 2014 WL 6680693, at *2. While asbestos is listed on the federal 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, silica is not. Toxicological 
Profile for Asbestos, Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease 
Registry (Sep. 2001), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp.asp?id=30& 
tid=4 [https://perma.cc/5X52-BF9Q]. 
92. Adams, 2014 WL 6680693, at *6. 
93. Raed A. Dweik & Peter J. Mazzone, Occupational Lung Disease, Cleve. 
Clinic Ctr. for Continuing Educ. (Aug. 2010), http://www. 
clevelandclinicmeded.com/medicalpubs/diseasemanagement/pulmonary/occupati
onal-lung-disease/ [https://perma.cc/UGB8-G9UN]. Although the court was 
correct that silica exposure occurs most commonly in the workplace, it may be a 
threat beyond the workplace as a component of hazardous particulate matter 
emanating from construction sites and other locations. See Particulate Matter 
(PM) Basics, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, https://www.epa.gov/ 
pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics [https://perma.cc/5SWP-YE5J] 
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and reflects the tenacity of the original justifications for repose 
statutes. 
Such inconsistencies and incremental steps are apparent 
elsewhere, where designating one or a couple of substances for ex-
clusion has created a jumble of separate rules and disparate 
treatment. Alaska’s construction statute of repose expressly excludes 
from its scope “prolonged exposure to hazardous waste,”94 but not 
exposure to other substances capable of causing latent illness. New 
Hampshire excludes from its eight-year repose period for real property 
improvements claims related to “nuclear power generation, nuclear 
waste storage, or the long-term storage of hazardous materials.”95 
Some states exclude only asbestos product liability claims and claims 
arising from silicone gel breast implants from the statutory period.96 
In Connecticut, the legislature has extended the repose period for 
asbestos-based product actions from the state’s ten-years-from-
delivery period to eighty years from last exposure for personal injury 
claims and thirty years from last contact for property damage 
claims.97 Idaho has enacted a special repose period for injuries due to 
ionizing radiation. The ordinary product liability repose period in 
Idaho is ten years from the time of delivery and sets up a presump-
tion that the useful safe life of the product begins at delivery and ends 
ten years later.98 The special statute of repose for injuries due to 
ionizing radiation extends the repose period from ten to thirty years 
from “the last occurrence to which the injury is attributed.”99 
The courts are tasked with interpreting statutes of repose, and the 
recent history of Indiana’s asbestos-product repose statute reveals just 
how tangled the interactions between the legislature and the courts 
may become. Indiana has been involved in an ongoing debate over 
whether its product statute of repose applies only to the sale of raw 
asbestos or includes within its scope the sale of products containing 
asbestos. The Indiana general product statute includes a repose pro-
vision of ten years from “delivery of the product to the initial user or 
 
(last updated Sept. 12, 2016); Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health, 
Silica, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention http://www. 
cdc.gov/niosh/topics/silica/ [https://perma.cc/DD35-DFCY]. 
94. Alaska Stat. § 09.10.055(b)(1)(A) (2007). 
95. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-b(V)(b) (2010). 
96. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.907(2) (2015) (asbestos); id. § 30.908(2) 
(silicone breast implants); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (2012) (both). 
97. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(e) (West 2013), amended by 2017 Conn. 
Legis. Serv. P.A. 17-97 (West). 
98. Idaho Code § 6-1403(1)–(2) (2010). 
99. Id. § 5-243. 
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consumer.”100 The legislature excluded certain asbestos claims,101 but 
only those brought against “persons who mined and sold commercial 
asbestos” and certain asbestos bankruptcy funds.102 In the 2003 case of 
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott,103 the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the 
classification in the asbestos exception, which meant that actions 
against defendants who sold asbestos-containing products rather than 
raw asbestos, were subject to the ten-years-from-delivery general 
statute of repose.104 The court further concluded that the statute was 
not constitutionally infirm, as it treated plaintiffs with asbestos pro-
duct liability claims in the same manner as plaintiffs with other 
product liability claims.105 
In a vigorous dissent in Ott, Justice Dickson lent a powerful voice 
to the policy arguments for excluding latent toxic illness claims from 
statutes of repose: 
There are no inherent characteristics that distinguish workers 
with asbestos-related diseases caused by exposure to raw 
asbestos from those with the same diseases brought about by 
exposure to manufactured products containing asbestos. Thus 
the unequal treatment accorded to each class cannot be 
reasonably related to any inherent differences. With the 
majority’s refusal to construe [the asbestos exception] to equally 
treat all persons with asbestos-related diseases, the product 
liability statute of repose clearly grants to persons whose 
diseases derive from raw asbestos substantial privileges and 
immunities that do not equally belong to identically situated 
 
100. Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b)(2) (2017). 
101. Id. § 34-20-3-2, invalidated by Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., 
Inc., 53 N.E.3d 1160, 1168 (Ind. 2016). The statute of limitations provides 
that a personal injury or property damage action based on exposure to 
asbestos “must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action 
accrues.” Id. § 34-20-3-2(a)(2). Accrual is based on the plaintiff’s knowledge of 
either an asbestos-related injury or property damage from asbestos. Id. § 34-
20-3-2(b)–(c). 
102. Id. § 34-20-3-2(d)(2). 
103. 785 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. 2003). 
104. Id. at 1073 (“We think that the language used by the Legislature represents 
its conscious intent to subject to [the asbestos exception] only those persons 
who produce raw asbestos—‘persons who mine[] and s[ell] commercial 
asbestos’—and leave those who sell asbestos-containing products within the 
ambit of [the repose statute].”). 
105. Id. at 1077. The court held that the exception did not violate the equal 
privileges and immunities clause of Indiana’s constitution because no 
“cognizable harm” resulted from subjecting plaintiffs suing asbestos product 
manufacturers to the ten-year repose statute. Id. 
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persons whose diseases result from asbestos-containing products. 
The constitutional violation is apparent.106 
Justice Dickson’s words must have resonated with the other members 
of the Indiana Supreme Court, as evidenced by its 2016 decision in 
Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Division of Cooper Industries, Inc.107 The 
court reflected anew on the disparate treatment of plaintiffs exposed 
to raw asbestos and those exposed to asbestos-containing products, 
holding that the classification violated the privileges and immunities 
clause of the Indiana Constitution.108 Justice Dickson wrote the 
opinion for the evenly split court.109 Not surprisingly, the key factor in 
the court’s decision was that asbestos plaintiffs’ personal injuries are 
identical regardless of the type of asbestos defendant—the same latent 
illnesses that develop over decades, often with a protracted period in 
which the plaintiff is symptom-free.110 The court concluded with an 
especially broad statement recognizing the special problems of all 
plaintiffs with latent illness claims: “As a result, the Product Liability 
Act statute of repose does not apply to cases involving protracted 
exposure to an inherently dangerous foreign substance . . . .”111 
The Myers decision potentially extends beyond asbestos to all 
other latent illness product liability claims, although the parameters 
of the terms “protracted exposure[s]” and “inherently dangerous 
foreign substance[s]” are unclear. What is indisputably clear is that, 
absent an exception, statutes of repose create two classes of latent 
illness plaintiffs—those who became sick before the repose period 
expired and those whose illnesses manifested after expiration—but 
reward only the former group with the ability to seek redress. Their 
illnesses may be identical, caused by exposure to the same substance 
 
106. Id. at 1083 (Dickson, J., dissenting). 
107. 53 N.E.3d 1160 (Ind. 2016). 
108. Id. at 1166. 
109. Id. at 1162. 
110. The court concluded that the disparate treatment of these two classes of 
asbestos plaintiffs violated the equal privileges and immunities clause because 
(1) the classification bore no reasonable relationship to “inherent 
characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated class,” and (2) 
although the classes were “similarly situated,” the statute impermissibly gave 
one class preferential treatment over the other. Id. at 1165–66 (quoting Collins 
v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994)). Because the asbestos statute 
contained a non-severability clause, the court invalidated the entire statute, 
although it stopped short of overruling Ott. See id. at 1168 (“While we decline 
to reconsider our decision in AlliedSignal v. Ott, we find that Section 2 of the 
Product Liability Act violates the Indiana Constitution.”). But the result was 
effectively to overrule that case. 
111. Id. at 1167. 
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and exhibiting the same etiology, distinguishable only by the length of 
the latency period. Taken to its logical conclusion—and illogical 
result—someone who had a short exposure to the substance but 
developed the illness within the repose period would be able to pursue 
a claim, while someone with a substantially greater exposure whose 
illness manifested after the expiration of the repose period would be 
barred. The open question in Indiana is whether Myers solves this 
problem, in whole or in part, for injuries other than asbestos. 
Myers may not be the end of the Indiana saga, however. The ink 
had barely dried on the Myers decision when a bill was introduced in 
January 2017 in the Indiana House that would repeal the asbestos 
exception and apply the repose statute to all asbestos claims, 
regardless of the defendant.112 If the legislature enacts a version of the 
proposed House bill, that would constitute a rejection of the Myers 
court’s recognition of the unique problems of latent illness plaintiffs. 
The cycle of challenges would likely begin again. At the present time, 
the Indiana Supreme Court’s broad statement on latent illnesses 
strongly suggests that the court would reach the same result in future 
cases involving exposure to toxic products other than asbestos. 
The Indiana example shows the state courts parsing a statute that 
has outlived both its rationality and its practicality. The dance be-
tween the legislature and the courts culminated in the only logical 
and humane result—though that result may be temporary, depending 
on the actions of the legislature. The process leading to that result 
was incremental and painfully slow. The tenacity of the legislative 
interests underlying the statute of repose accounts for such a politi-
cized and protracted process of reform. 
In a broader context, the Indiana example demonstrates that 
many state legislatures lack an understanding of the universal 
characteristics of latent toxic illness and the unique challenges experi-
enced by latent illness plaintiffs—or they are simply willing to ignore 
those hardships and cater to certain economic interests instead. The 
various substances excluded from some states’ repose periods113 tend 
to be those that have either generated the most litigation or received 
the most publicity in the particular jurisdiction, which is just a 
variation of the squeaky wheel adage. The reality is that all latent 
illnesses, regardless of the exposures causing them, present the 
identical legal challenges for plaintiffs confronted with statutes of 
repose. 
Statutes of repose for claims related to improvements to real 
property also have been subjected to similar desultory treatment, as 
illustrated by a handful of cases under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin 
 
112. H.B. 1276, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017). 
113. For examples, see supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
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statute of repose provides that an action must be commenced no later 
than ten years after the “substantial completion of the improvement 
to real property” on which the action is based.114 Asbestos defendants 
seized upon this statute to defend personal injury actions brought by 
plaintiffs who were exposed to asbestos while working in a variety of 
construction and remediation settings. In Peter v. Sprinkmann Sons 
Corporation,115 a Wisconsin appellate court allowed an asbestos 
personal injury action to go forward because the plaintiff’s decedent 
had been exposed to asbestos while working on repairs to real 
property, not on improvements. The statute explicitly excludes repairs 
from its scope.116 The court concluded that the decedent’s work 
making routine repairs to insulation on machine pipe did not con-
stitute “improvements to real property” within the meaning of the 
statute of repose.117 In Ahnert v. Employers Insurance Company,118 a 
federal court, applying the same Wisconsin provisions, stated that the 
exclusion of repairs from the repose provision “is reasonable because 
improvements to real property have a completion date whereas 
regular repairs and maintenance can continue ad infinitum.”119 In the 
context of latent illness cases, however, the distinction between 
repairs and improvements is virtually meaningless. Developing meso-
thelioma in the course of work on real property has the same effects 
 
114. Wis. Stat. § 893.89(1) (2015–16). 
115. 860 N.W.2d 308 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015). 
116. Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(c) (2015–16) (stating that the statute of repose “does 
not apply to . . . damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, 
operation or inspection of an improvement to real property.”). 
117. Peter, 860 N.W.2d at 315. The court relied upon a distinction between 
“improvements” and “maintenance and repairs” that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had adopted in several earlier cases. See, e.g., Kohn v. Darlington 
Cmty. Schs., 698 N.W.2d 794, 815 (Wis. 2005) (“Owners and occupiers are 
protected to the extent they are involved in the actual improvement of the 
property. They are not protected for post-improvement conduct, such as 
negligent inspection or maintenance of the improvement.”); see also Brezonick 
v. A.W. Chesterton Co., No. 2014AP2775, 2015 WL 9283609, at *7 (Wis. 
App. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant on 
the ground that the plaintiff’s decedent was exposed to asbestos while 
engaged in repair and maintenance work within the meaning of the statute of 
repose). 
118. No. 13-C-1456, 2016 WL 97612 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2016). 
119. Id. at *6. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the statute of 
repose was unconstitutional as applied to asbestos-related disease claims. Id. 
at *6 n.4 (citing Kohn, 698 N.W.2d at 818 (Wis. 2005)). 
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on the worker’s health whether the work could be categorized as an 
improvement to property or repairs and maintenance.120 
North Carolina’s pastiche of repose statutes tells another tale of 
the inadequacy of an incremental approach to latent illness claims. 
The state’s general statute of repose for personal injuries or property 
damage provides that “no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 
years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the 
cause of action.”121 A separate repose statute, which apparently over-
rides the general repose statute, applies to claims arising from “any 
alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product;” repose in these 
cases occurs twelve years from “initial purchase for use or consump-
tion.”122  
A third statute, which by its terms modifies the ten-year general 
tort statute of repose, carves out an exception for claims arising from 
groundwater contamination: 
The 10-year period . . . shall not be construed to bar an action 
for personal injury, or property damages caused or contributed 
to by groundwater contaminated by a hazardous substance, 
pollutant, or contaminant, including personal injury or property 
damages resulting from the consumption, exposure, or use of 
water supplied from groundwater contaminated by a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant.123 
This exception was enacted in the wake of the 2014 United States 
Supreme Court decision in CTS Corporation v. Waldburger,124 where 
the Court considered whether a discovery statute of limitations in the 
federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”)125 preempted application of the North 
 
120. Interestingly, Wisconsin recognizes these inequities in its product liability 
statute of repose. The statute imposes a repose period of 15 years from the 
time of manufacture, but expressly excludes claims based upon latent illness. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(5) (2015–16) (“This subsection does not apply to an 
action based on a claim for damages caused by a latent disease.”); see infra 
notes 171–176 and accompanying text. The statute also contains an exception 
for negligence and breach of warranty claims. Wis. Stat. § 895.047(6) 
(2015–16). But the legislature has not taken the same approach for real 
property improvement actions. 
121. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (2015). 
122. Id. § 1-46.1. 
123. Id. § 130A-26.3. The statute defines “hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant” as “the concentration of the hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant exceed[ing] a groundwater quality standard set forth in 15A 
NCAC 2L.0202.” Id. 
124. 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014). 
125. 42 U.S.C § 9658 (2012). CERCLA is also known as the Superfund statute. 
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Carolina statute of repose in a state-law nuisance claim arising from 
toxic chemical contamination.126 In its far-reaching decision, the 
Supreme Court held that while the CERCLA discovery provision pre-
empts relevant state statutes of limitations, it does not preempt state 
statutes of repose,127 leaving to state legislatures and courts the task of 
determining whether any extensions or exclusions apply to the repose 
statute. 
The groundwater exception, however, left a gaping hole. 
Excluding only those illnesses caused by contaminated groundwater 
was severely restrictive, regardless of any environmental policy the 
statute embodied. The exception ignored identical or similar latent 
illnesses caused by other types of environmental pollution—outdoor or 
indoor—and excluded persons who were exposed to contaminated 
groundwater prior to enactment of the exception in 2014 but whose 
illnesses did not manifest until later. 
One decision applying North Carolina law awkwardly attempted 
to correct this omission. In Stahle v. CTS Corporation,128 the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the term “personal injury” in 
North Carolina’s general statute of repose did not encompass latent 
disease claims.129 The court worked hard to make this distinction, 
saying that while the general repose period applied to “latent injury,” 
it did not apply to disease.130 As a result, plaintiffs with latent disease 
claims would not be subject to the general statute of repose.131 The 
Fourth Circuit offered little support for its interpretation in North 
Carolina state decisions, relying mostly on a 1985 North Carolina 
Supreme Court case that involved occupational disease and the stat-
ute of limitations.132 The court did not address the interaction of the 
 
126. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2180. The North Carolina groundwater exception 
applied only prospectively from the time of its enactment in 2014. See Bryant 
v. United States, 768 F.3d 1378, 1385 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing McCrater v. 
Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 104 S.E.2d 858, 860 (N.C. 1958)). 
127. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2187–88. 
128. 817 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 2016). 
129. Id. at 100. 
130. Id. at 104 (“North Carolina law clearly establishes that a disease is not a 
latent injury.”). 
131. It remains to be seen whether the Fourth Circuit’s statutory interpretation 
gains traction, especially in North Carolina state courts. And, as the 
concurring judge lamented, the court could not certify the question to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court and was therefore without its guidance. Id. at 
113–15 (Thacker, J., concurring). 
132. See id. at 104 (citing Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 336 S.E.2d 66, 70–71 (N.C. 
1985)). Wilder v. Amatex Corp. contained language supportive of the Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling in Stahle: “Both the [North Carolina Supreme] Court and the 
legislature have long been cognizant of the difference between diseases on the 
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groundwater exception with the general repose statute, as the 
plaintiff’s claim arose prior to the exception’s 2014 enactment. This 
ongoing uncertainty highlights the frustratingly sluggish and sporadic 
process of ameliorating the negative and disparate impact of these 
statutes of repose in individual cases, even when that impact is 
acknowledged. 
As these various examples demonstrate, states seem to be 
awakening to the need for substantial statute of repose reform for 
latent illness claims, but most reforms have continued to lead to 
contradictory or anomalous results. Sporadic and incremental efforts 
are insufficient; a more comprehensive approach is necessary. Al-
though a few states have taken more assertive steps to eliminate the 
problems, as discussed in the next Part, these reforms remain 
insufficient. 
III. A Simple Solution Within Reach 
A. The Need for a Broad Latent Illness Exclusion 
Latent illnesses are unlike other tort injuries, a distinction that 
has been uniformly recognized by state legislatures and courts in stat-
ute of limitations jurisprudence. Thus, those statutes provide that an 
action accrues at the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the illness 
and—in most jurisdictions—its likely cause. Why, then, do so many 
states continue to apply their statutes of repose to latent illness cases? 
The answer is relatively indefensible. States are concerned with pro-
tecting defendants from unpredictable future costs that may be 
“undue and unlimited.”133 But, as the Utah legislature acknowledged, 
the passage of time renders future injury “highly remote.”134 These 
justifications are contradictory. The more remote the possibility of 
litigation after a certain period of time, the less likely that “undue 
and unlimited” costs will surprise defendants.135 If the likelihood of 
litigation far into the future is so “remote” and “unexpected,” pre-
sumably it would be rare. What would be the harm—or the great 
“social evil”—in allowing the litigation? The Alabama legislature 
expressed concern that the costs of insuring remote product liability 
claims would be prohibitive.136 But plaintiffs are at a distinct 
 
one hand and other kinds of injury on the other from the standpoint of 
identifying legally relevant time periods.” 
133. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2012); see supra notes 32–
36 and accompanying text. 
134. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2012). 
135. Id. § 78B-2-225(2)(b). 
136. Ala. Code § 6-5-500 (2014). 
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disadvantage in proving their cases after a long passage of time. 
Evidence of exposure may be lost or destroyed in the course of 
business; witnesses may have disappeared. The longer the latency 
period between exposure to a toxic substance and manifestation of 
illness, the more difficult the task of proving causation, largely 
because of the possibility of intervening and superseding causes. 
As previously mentioned, one reason legislatures enacted product 
liability statutes of repose was the expansion of liability for product 
sellers under the strict product liability regime, including 
abandonment of the rules of privity of contract.137 But these justifica-
tions for statutes of repose have become largely obsolete. Recent 
decades have seen a contraction of strict liability, as reflected in the 
Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, which espouses a 
risk-utility test and safer alternative design requirement for design 
defect claims138 and a straightforward negligence test for failure-to-
warn claims.139 Moreover, federal preemption has become an impor-
tant defense in many toxic tort cases, which benefits product sellers 
by precluding many product liability actions.140 In holding the New 
Hampshire product liability statute of repose unconstitutional, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that “persons injured by 
defective products are deprived arbitrarily of a right to sue the manu-
facturers responsible for those defective products by virtue of a 
statute that has become entirely divorced from its underlying 
purpose.”141 To the extent that outmoded policy rationales are em-
bedded in many state statutes of repose, the statutes have outlived 
their original purpose. 
Another rationale for product liability statutes of repose was that 
they provide added protection for sellers of products as those products 
 
137. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. Similarly, abandonment of 
privity of contract has been cited as one reason underlying statutes of repose 
for claims based upon improvements to real property. See Leichling v. 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 842 F.3d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Rose v. Fox 
Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906, 911−13 (Md. 1994)). 
138. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) (Am. 
Law Inst. 1998). 
139. Id. § 2(c). 
140. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Mature Product Preemption Doctrine: The 
Unitary Standard and the Paradox of Consumer Protection, 60 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 95, 115–32 (2009) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on preemption of state product liability claims); Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57 
Ala. L. Rev. 725, 752–69 (2006) (analyzing the normative subtext of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s product liability preemption cases). 
141. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 296 (N.H. 1983). 
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age and deteriorate from normal use.142 Again, that rationale fails to 
hold up in cases of latent injury. A latent illness plaintiff typically 
was exposed to the substance causing the illness months, years, or 
decades before the illness manifested in symptoms causally associated 
with the exposure—in other words, at a time when the product likely 
had not deteriorated. Indeed, the old-product rationale fails even 
when the plaintiff’s exposure was after the repose period had expired. 
Product sellers are the most knowledgeable entities about the aging of 
their own products under normal use and have marketing data to 
determine the potential for future liability. As a result, they can 
procure sufficient liability insurance coverage and take advantage of 
traditional defenses such as assumption of the risk and comparative 
fault.143 
Statutes of repose for real property improvements are also based 
on a set of erroneous presumptions. The concept of “latent injury” in 
the construction and property improvement context is traditionally 
associated with latent undiscoverable conditions that may cause 
accidents years later when the plaintiff encounters the condition.144 
Generally, legislatures did not contemplate that illnesses would fall 
within the meaning of latent injury in this context. Nor did they 
contemplate the situation in which a plaintiff has an earlier exposure 
or multiple exposures that triggers a disease process with physical 
manifestations that appear and are diagnosable much later, after the 
expiration of the repose period. The result mirrors that in toxic pro-
duct liability cases, in which those whose illnesses manifested after the 
repose period would be barred while persons whose identical illnesses 
manifested within the repose period could maintain their claims. 
Furthermore, persons whose latent illnesses arose from exposures to 
substances associated with real property improvements would be 
barred from suit in a way that persons exposed to the same sub-
stances by other means may not. 
 
142. See Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, 
Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 796, 845–46 (1983). 
143. See generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
§§ 17–18 (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (defining apportionment of responsibility, 
disclaimers, and other contractual exculpations); David G. Owen, 
Products Liability Law § 13.1–.4, at 792–876 (2005) (explaining the use 
of contributory negligence, comparative fault, and assumption of the risk as 
defenses to product liability claims). 
144. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337.15 (West 2006) (running ten years from 
“substantial completion” for injuries arising from a “latent deficiency”). The 
legislature defined “latent deficiency” as “not apparent by reasonable 
inspection,” clearly referencing the condition of the property. See id. 
§ 337.15(b). 
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B. Seeking a Solution 
As discussed in Part II of this Article, some state legislatures have 
recognized the unfairness of applying statutes of repose to latent ill-
ness claims, but have failed to take sufficient steps to remedy the 
problem. Only by enacting a broad exclusion for latent illnesses—
applicable across the board for all tort claims and consistent with the 
discovery statutes of limitations—will the problems be adequately 
addressed. A few states have shown a willingness to consider such a 
solution, but have stopped short of a complete and comprehensive 
exclusion for latent illness claims. These statutes represent a sub-
stantial improvement over the ad hoc statutes discussed earlier by 
broadly focusing on latent illness claims. It is instructive to examine 
their approaches as they provide insight into the state legislatures’ 
reticence and reveal the shortcomings of any approach short of an 
absolute exclusion. 
These broader approaches fall into two general categories. The 
first category may best be viewed as an extension of the single-
substance exceptions previously discussed.145 While evincing a good-
faith effort to address the pitfalls of repose for latent illness plaintiffs, 
these statutes offer little more than a narrow hit-or-miss approach. 
These statutes, exemplified by Iowa and Kansas, contain exceptions 
for latent illness caused by exposure to “harmful materials,” which the 
statutes then list.146 Using almost identical language, the “harmful 
materials” are defined by both states as: 
[S]ilicone gel breast implants . . . ; . . .	  asbestos, dioxins, . . . or 
polychlorinated biphenyls, whether alone or as part of any 
product; or any substance which is determined to present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment by the 
United States environmental protection agency pursuant to the 
federal Toxic Substance Control Act . . . or by [the] 
state . . . .147 
Iowa includes tobacco in the list of harmful materials, but Kansas 
does not.148 Although the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) 
 
145. See supra notes 78–116 and accompanying text.  
146. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2A)(b)(1) (2017) (excepting exposure to “harmful 
materials” from the general repose period of fifteen years from first purchase); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(d)(1) (2005), preempted on other grounds by 
Troutman v. Curtis, 143 P.3d 74 (2006) (excepting exposure to harmful 
material from the general repose period of ten years from time of delivery). 
147. Iowa Code § 614.1(2A)(b)(2) (2017). 
148. Id.; see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(d)(2) (2005), preempted on other 
grounds by Troutman v. Curtis, 143 P.3d 74 (2006). 
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could be a convenient benchmark, not all substances capable of 
causing latent illness, such as prescription drugs, are regulated under 
TSCA, which was rewritten and re-authorized in 2016 by the Frank 
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act.149 Moreover, 
the parameters of the new TSCA have yet to be tested. Thus, as a 
practical matter, using TSCA to identify excluded substances has its 
own set of problems. Both Iowa and Kansas limit the exception for 
latent illness to product liability claims.150 Indeed, the Iowa statute 
explicitly states that the exception does not apply to latent illness 
claims related to improvements to real property.151 
The second category is typified by the few states that have 
enacted an exception for claims alleging exposures within the repose 
period followed by a disease manifestation after that time. These stat-
utes represent a better approach than the laundry-list exceptions, but 
do not adequately solve the problem. The Texas statute of repose for 
product liability claims provides that “a claimant must commence a 
products liability action against a manufacturer or seller of a product 
before the end of fifteen years after the date of the sale of the product 
by the defendant.”152 The exception to this rule for latent injuries 
states: 
 
(d) This section does not apply to a products liability action 
seeking damages for personal injury or wrongful death in which 
the claimant alleges: 
(1) the claimant was exposed to the product that is the 
subject of the action before the end of 15 years after the date 
the product was first sold; 
(2) the claimant’s exposure to the product caused the 
claimant’s disease that is the basis of the action; and 
(3) the symptoms of the claimant’s disease did not, before the 
end of 15 years after the date of the first sale of the product 
by the defendant, manifest themselves to a degree and for a 
 
149. See Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. 
No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016) (amending 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601 et seq. 
(2012)). 
150. Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(11)(a)(3) (2017) (running eight years from the 
defendant’s injury-causing action for actions arising from improvements to 
real property); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(d)(1) (20005), preempted on 
other grounds by Troutman v. Curtis 143 P.3d 74 (2006). 
151. Iowa Code § 614.1(2A)(b)(1) (2017). 
152. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.012(b) (West 2002). 
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duration that would put a reasonable person on notice that 
the person suffered some injury.153 
 
This exception is deficient for several reasons. 
First, ambiguous terms in the exception leave open the possibility 
of a narrow interpretation. Substantial questions of fact could exist in 
determining whether the plaintiff’s symptoms were of the “degree” 
and “duration” to place “a reasonable person on notice.”154 Place the 
person on notice of what? Subsection (3) states that it is notice “that 
the person suffered some injury,” but says nothing about knowledge of 
the likely cause of that injury, which is only referenced in subsection 
(2).155 While this last point is relevant to the discovery statute of 
limitations, rather than the statute of repose, the imprecise language 
shows how easily the concepts and problems become entangled; they 
are actually two distinct issues. Second, the Texas exception does not 
encompass all injuries, but is limited to personal injuries and wrongful 
death. Third, the exception applies only to the product liability stat-
ute of repose; the Texas statutes of repose for improvements to real 
property noticeably omit any language that could be construed to 
apply to latent illness.156 In fact, somewhat perversely, legislation in-
troduced in January 2017 would amend the real property improve-
ments repose statute to reduce the repose period from ten years to 
five years.157 The best that can be said about the Texas approach is 
that it allows a limited number of claims that would otherwise be 
barred by repose. While Texas recognizes the timing problem of latent 
illness, it does not offer a solution for the inequitable results. 
 
153. Id. § 16.012(d); see also id. § 16.012(d-1) (“This section does not reduce a 
limitations period for a cause of action described by Subsection (d) that 
accrues before the end of the limitations period under this section.”). It is 
noteworthy that the exception only covers claims for personal injuries and 
wrongful death, not claims for property damages. The basic statute defines 
“products liability action,” including a list of types of relief that may be 
sought. Id. § 16.012(a)(2). Claims for property damages, personal injuries, and 
wrongful death all appear on this list, so the absence of property damages in 
the exception leaves no doubt that the legislature intended to omit them from 
that subsection. Id. § 16.012(a)(2)(A). 
154. Id. § 16.012(d)(3). 
155. Id. § 16.012(d)(2)–(3).  
156. See id. § 16.008 (applying the statute of repose to architects, engineers, and 
others engaged in designing, planning, or inspecting the improvement); id. 
§ 16.009(a) (applying the statute of repose to those engaged in the 
construction of the improvement). 
157. H.B. 1053, 85th Leg. (Tex. 2017). 
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Nor does Florida, which has enacted a similar exception, avoid 
these pitfalls.  Florida’s basic product statute of repose is keyed into 
both the “expected useful life” and date of delivery: 
Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for 
products liability . . . to recover for harm allegedly caused by a 
product with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, if the 
harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more 
than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser 
or lessee . . . .158 
The statute declares that “[a]ll products . . . are conclusively pre-
sumed to have an expected useful life of 10 years or less.”159 The 
exception for latent injury claims provides that the repose period 
“does not apply if the claimant was exposed to or used the product 
within the repose period, but an injury caused by such exposure or 
use did not manifest itself until after expiration of the repose 
period.”160 The statute is broader than the Texas statute, as it in-
cludes property damages, but does not extend to all latent illness 
plaintiffs, only those whose exposures occurred within the repose 
period. Like Texas, the Florida statute of repose for improvements to 
real property applies its ten-year repose period to all actions, regard-
less of whether they involve latent injuries.161 
Idaho’s product liability repose statute contains a provision that 
appears on its face to be a broader latent illness exception: 
The ten (10) year period of repose . . . shall not apply if the 
harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product, 
or if the injury-causing aspect of the product that existed at the 
time of delivery was not discoverable by an ordinary reasonably 
prudent person until more than ten (10) years after the time of 
 
158. Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (2017). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. § 95.031(2)(c). See generally R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 190 
So. 3d 1028, 1038 (Fla. 2016) (discussing the “unique problem” of latent 
illness in the context of a toxic tort case). The court employed the term 
“creeping disease,” which had been used in earlier Florida decisions, and 
concluded that at least for the purposes of the Florida statute of limitations 
“a plaintiff should not, and cannot, be required to file a cause of action before 
even realizing that the cause of action exists.” Id. This view will likely guide 
the court in any future decisions interpreting the exception. 
161. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(c) (2017). The Kansas product liability statute 
also contains an exception for “prolonged exposure.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
3303(b)(2)(D) (2005), preempted on other grounds by Troutman v. Curtis, 
143 P.3d 74 (2006). 
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delivery, or if the harm, caused within ten (10) years after the 
time of delivery, did not manifest itself until after that time.162 
This provision suffers from the same linguistic infirmities as the Texas 
statute, however. For example, to be “prolonged,” must the exposure 
have been continuous during and after the repose period? To satisfy 
the “injury-causing aspect” requirement, is it sufficient to offer expert 
evidence of a causal connection between the product and the illness, 
or must the plaintiff also offer evidence of the specific defect con-
nected to the hazard? As in Texas and Florida, the Idaho statute of 
repose for improvements to real property is untouched by this excep-
tion.163 
In Georgia, the product liability statute of repose—ten years from 
the first sale of the product for use or consumption for actions against 
manufacturers—applies to strict liability and negligence claims, but 
not to failure to warn claims.164 The statute contains an exception for 
negligence actions against a product manufacturer for “a disease or 
birth defect.”165 One difficulty with the statute is its fragmented 
nature: It applies to some product claims but not all, and to some 
injuries but not others.166 Furthermore, in product liability law, the 
distinction between negligence and failure to warn is in nomenclature 
only,167 yet Georgia law insists on the awkward separation of these 
claims for the apparent purpose of barring some of them.168 In apply-
ing the exception only to negligence actions, the legislature subjects 
persons with diseases or birth defects to the statute of repose for strict 
liability claims. This incongruity has the effect of enhancing the 
burden of these plaintiffs, as they must prove that the manufacturer 
 
162. Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1403(2)(b)(4) (2010). 
163. Id. § 5-241. 
164. Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)(2), (c) (2007). 
165. Id. § 51-1-11(c). 
166. See, e.g., Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that “it is possible to have a situation where the plaintiff is barred 
from bringing a design defect claim and yet is allowed to proceed with a 
failure to warn claim based upon the dangers arising from the same alleged 
design defect”). 
167. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) 
(Am. Law Inst. 1998) (stating that a product is defective for failure to warn 
“when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by 
the seller . . . and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the 
product not reasonably safe”). This Section states a negligence standard. 
168. See Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 213 (Ga. 1994) (holding that 
negligent failure to warn claims arising from a defectively designed product 
are not covered by the statute of repose). 
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acted negligently if they expect to be able to bring a claim after the 
repose period has expired, a task which is not ordinarily required for 
strict liability claims.169 
C. A Simpler, Fairer, and More Predictable Model 
What the foregoing states have in common is a good-faith effort 
to minimize the problems of latent illness plaintiffs by enacting 
broader exceptions that reach beyond single substances, at least in the 
context of product liability actions. They employ more inclusive lan-
guage, such as “harmful materials” or the generic term “disease,” to 
describe the exception. But despite the progress that these statutes 
represent, they remain deficient. There is, however, a simple solution. 
In states determined to retain their statutes of repose,170 legislatures 
should impose an absolute latent illness exclusion, for both product 
liability actions and real property improvement claims. Short of a 
ruling that the statute is unconstitutional, an absolute exclusion is the 
only means to avoid the inequities and disparate treatment experi-
enced by latent illness claimants. 
What would such an exclusion look like? Wisconsin’s product 
liability statute of repose contains a suitably broad exclusion. The 
statute states that the repose period of fifteen years from the date of 
manufacture “does not apply to an action based on a claim for 
damages caused by a latent disease.”171 The statute makes clear that 
the exclusion applies to all product liability claims and product de-
fendants allowable in the state.172 More generally, it also contains an 
absolute exclusion for negligence and breach of warranty product 
claims.173 While the exclusion leaves to the courts a determination 
 
169. The Third Restatement has brought strict liability claims much closer to 
negligence claims, however, by focusing on the behavior of the manufacturer 
in developing the product. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability § 2(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (stating that a product is defective 
in design “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by 
the seller . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product 
not reasonably safe”). 
170. Many of the arguments in this Article in favor of an absolute exclusion for 
latent illness would apply equally to an argument to abrogate statutes of 
repose more generally. That argument is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
to the extent that statutes of repose embody archaic concerns, full 
reconsideration is warranted. 
171. Wis. Stat. § 895.047(5) (2015–16). 
172. Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)–(2) (2015–16) (providing, with some provisos, for a 
variety of strict liability claims against product manufacturers, sellers, and 
distributors). 
173. Id. § 895.047(6). 
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whether the plaintiff’s illness was within the legislature’s contem-
plation of “latent disease,” it avoids the line drawing, linguistic 
acrobatics, and counter-intuitive results associated with so many 
other statutes. 
Not even Wisconsin, however, has extended the exclusion to its 
statute of repose for improvements to real property.174 Yet the same 
problems and inconsistencies exist for latent illness plaintiffs who may 
bring their actions past the time of repose set by those statutes. 
Potential plaintiffs are at risk for identical illnesses, regardless of 
when they may manifest. To discriminate against those plaintiffs who 
develop their illnesses past the repose period is manifestly unfair. 
Plaintiffs with latent illnesses caused by contamination from an im-
provement to real property have as much reason as product liability 
plaintiffs to be allowed to maintain their claims regardless of the time 
of diagnosis or manifestation. These plaintiffs most likely have had no 
control over the circumstances that gave rise to their exposure and 
injury. While the design and building defendants may have relin-
quished control years earlier, these defendants are in possession of the 
information to assist courts and juries in identifying the defect and 
determining whether causation is met.175 An underlying premise of 
these repose statutes is that as time passes, it is more likely that some 
intervening action or lack of proper maintenance by the property 
owner was the cause of the injury. This premise is evidenced by the 
fact that claims against property owners are commonly excepted from 
the statute of repose.176 But latent injuries may also be the fault of 
those who created the improvement and along with it the original 
defect; and the defect may not be detectable to the property owner in 
the ordinary course of using the land and structures. Allowing injured 
persons to bring actions against both the owners and the parties 
responsible for creating the improvement would ensure that all the 
circumstances of the injury are fully addressed and would make avail-
able more pockets for settlement or verdicts, assuming the plaintiffs 
are able to prove their cases after a long passage of time. Logic and 
tort principles dictate that if fault is shared among two or more re-
sponsible parties, then liability should also be allocated among those 
parties, unless their contractual agreements provide otherwise. 
Compelling public policies also support an absolute exclusion. 
Product sellers who are required to answer to future plaintiffs will be 
encouraged to keep better track of their products through post-market 
 
174. See id. § 893.89; see supra notes 113–119 and accompanying text. 
175. The design and building defendants are certainly in a superior position to the 
injured plaintiff to provide information on the defect. In most cases they will 
be in an equal or superior position to the landowner as well. 
176. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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surveillance, assure strict compliance with safety regulations, and buy 
adequate insurance. Their costs would be incorporated into the costs 
of doing business using the traditional mechanisms of liability insur-
ance and appropriately pricing their products. But in the digital era of 
the twenty-first century, those mechanisms and the available infor-
mation to assess them are more sophisticated than ever imagined 
when statutes of repose were first deemed necessary. If the potential 
for liability many years or decades into the future is unlikely—due to 
the probability of missing evidence and the difficulty of proving 
causation—nothing should prevent insurance companies from 
appropriately pricing their liability insurance products, especially 
considering the wide availability of big data in the insurance industry. 
Although there is little to prevent surprise mass litigation, the same 
may be said at any point in time, including soon after the pro–duct 
has been sold.177 Moreover, at least some costly mass litigation could 
have been prevented or minimized if defendants had only acknowl-
edged available studies and acted upon that knowledge at an early 
date. The extent of asbestos and tobacco litigation may appear to 
have been unanticipated, but sellers of both products had reason to 
know decades earlier that their products were harmful.178 The goal of 
deterrence is more properly served by the possibility of litigation than 
by immunity from suit. 
If latent illness plaintiffs are excluded from statutes of repose for 
real property improvements, potential design and building defendants’ 
dealings with subcontractors and suppliers of materials will become 
more important, presumably resulting in safer design and construction 
in the first instance. Transparently negotiated indemnification clauses 
in their contracts with their subcontractors and with the landowners 
financing the project—including an explicit understanding that liabil-
ity may stretch into the future for certain injuries that are not easily 
 
177. See generally, In re Takata Airbags Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1324 
(S.D. Fla. 2016) (addressing a federal multi-district motor vehicle airbag 
litigation).  
178. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089−90 (5th Cir. 
1973) (holding that the manufacturers’ status as experts required them to be 
aware of the existing studies on the danger of asbestos, conduct their own 
studies, and warn users of the foreseeable dangers); see also, Jean Macchiaroli 
Eggen, The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health: Lessons From a 
Century of Cigarettes, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 561, 586−94 (2008) (discussing the 
epidemiological studies on smoking in the context of their impact on toxic tort 
litigation). See generally Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century: 
The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That 
Defined America (2007) (discussing the hold that the tobacco industry has 
had on the American public despite the many studies demonstrating the 
hazards of smoking). 
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discoverable—should clarify the understandings of the parties regard-
ing the extent of liability the clauses cover. 
Plaintiffs are at the mercy of state legislatures in any event. The 
legislators are more beholden to special interests and politics than the 
members of the judicial branch.179 Even though state judges are likely 
to be elected, the rules of procedure, evidence, and professional re-
sponsibility are designed to even the playing field among adversaries 
to the greatest possible extent. But state legislators have fewer 
constraints and may be swayed by business, insurance, and other 
corporate interests and monetary contributions in formulating legis-
lation. Statutes of repose clearly reflect this distinction. 
Conclusion 
Statutes of repose were enacted to protect defendants from stale 
claims, with little or no consideration of fairness to plaintiffs who 
developed latent illnesses that were undetectable until after the repose 
period expired. The fact that some states have carved out an excep-
tion to their repose statutes for asbestos-related disease or other latent 
illnesses demonstrates that states are well aware of the special dis-
ability their statutes of repose impose upon latent illness plaintiffs. 
Constitutional challenges to statutes of repose have had some success, 
but many states remain tenaciously committed to protecting certain 
business interests regardless of the consequences to injured parties. 
Decades ago, states revised their tort statutes of limitations by 
enacting discovery rules whereby a claim accrued only when the plain-
tiff knew of the injury and the likely cause. These revised statutes of 
limitations acknowledged the unique predicament of plaintiffs who 
suffer from latent illnesses. In contrast, however, many states have 
retained their statutes of repose, in whole or in part, notwithstanding 
the obsolescence of the premises and policies on which the statutes are 
based. Ad hoc efforts to accommodate toxic tort plaintiffs have not 
resolved the problem and instead have created various classifications 
with disparate treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs. It is time to 
fully recognize the fundamental unfairness of these statutes of repose 
in this context. States should enact an absolute exclusion to their tort 
statutes of repose for latent toxic claims. 
 
 
179. See McGovern, supra note 61, at 431. 
